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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kevin Mingo appeals from the district court's Judgment summarily denying his
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

Mr. Mingo asserts that the district court erred in

dismissing his counsel and requiring him to represent himself at an evidentiary hearing
without ensuring that Mr. Mingo understood the risks of proceeding pro se or that he
was competent to proceed as his own counsel, and that such error caused or
contributed to the denial of his petition and deprived Mr. Mingo of his right to due
process of law.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On February 14, 2013, Kevin Mingo entered an Alford1 plea to one count of
possession of a controlled substance.

(Court's Exhibit 2, p.4.)

On April 22, 2013,

Mr. Mingo, was sentenced to seven years, with two years fixed. (R., p.11.) Mr. Mingo
appealed from his judgment of conviction in Idaho Supreme Court case number 410832013, but the direct appeal was dismissed on July 15, 2013. 2 (Order Granting Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, attached to the Motion to Augment, filed 9/25/14; 12/16/13 Tr., p.9,
Ls.10-16.)
On July 30, 2013, Mr. Mingo filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that
his plea was invalid because he lacked the mental capacity to make decisions, stand

Norlh Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal pursuant to the State's motion
to dismiss as Mr. Mingo waived his right to appeal as part of the plea agreement.
(Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal, attached to the Motion to Augment, filed
9/25/14.)
1

2

1

trial, or enter into a valid plea agreement due to a motorcycle accident in 2012, and that
his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not explain the proceedings to
Mr. Mingo, failed to raise issues that Mr. Mingo wanted raised, and failed to file a Rule
35 motion as Mr. Mingo had requested.

(R., pp.11-17.) The district court appointed

counsel to represent Mr. Mingo on July 31, 2013. (R., p.22.) Mr. Mingo, acting prose,
filed an amended petition and affidavit on August 30, 2013, in which he claimed that his
trial counsel did not properly investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the
traffic stop which led to the discovery of the evidence against him, and that he should be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. 3 (R., pp.31-36.) On September 18, 2013, the State
filed an Answer in which it responded only to Mr. Mingo's original claims. (R., pp.4044.)
On February 3, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which
Mr. Mingo was present.

(See 2/3/14 Tr.; R., pp.73-79.) Mr. Mingo asked the district

court to fire his attorney and to appoint a different attorney advisor to assist him at his
hearings and to provide legal advice. (2/3/14 Tr., p.17, L.18 - p.18, L.1.) The district
court dismissed Mr. Mingo's appointed counsel, told Mr. Mingo he was now
representing himself and asked him if he wished to make an opening statement.
(2/3/14 Tr., p.18, Ls.5-19.) During the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mingo acted as his own

3

Although Mr. Mingo filed an amended petition on August 30, 2013, as noted by the
State in its Answer filed on September 18, 2013, the district court's July 31, 2013, order
required Mr. Mingo to file an amended petition by August 28, 2013. (R., pp.24, 31-36,
40.) Thus, the State did not respond to the allegations contained in Mr. Mingo's
amended petition (R., pp.40-44 ), and on appeal Mr. Mingo will focus on the allegations
contained in his initial petition.

2

attorney, but often expressed his reservations and asked the district court for legal
assistance on multiple occasions. (2/3/14 Tr.,

18, L.20 - p.48, L.24.)

After hearing argument and testimony, the district court took the matter under
advisement and, on the next day, February 4, 2014, it entered an order denying
Mr. Mingo's post-conviction petition on the grounds that, Mr. Mingo did not prove
ineffective assistance of counsel, or any other basis for post-conviction relief.
(R, pp.106-108.) The district court found that, where Mr. Mingo alleged in his petition
that he was coerced into entering his plea and that he was not mentally capable of
entering a plea, the guilty plea advisory form and the plea colloquy between Mr. Mingo
and the district court "absolutely contradicted" those assertions and further, that neither
of the assertions were supported by evidence at the evidentiary hearing. (R., p.107.)
On February 4, 2014, the district court entered a final judgment.

(R., pp.109-

110.)
On February 20, 2014, Mr. Mingo filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district
court's final Judgment and order denying his Petition. (R., pp.123-128.)

3

ISSUE

the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Mingo's counsel and required Mr. Mingo
to proceed pro se during his post-conviction evidentiary hearing, thus depriving
Mr. Mingo of his right to due process of law??

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Mingo's Appointed Counsel And
Required Him To Proceed Pro Se At His Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing Thus
Depriving Mr. Mingo Of His Right To Due Process Of Law

A.

Introduction
As a matter of first impression in Idaho, Mr. Mingo asserts that the district court

erred in dismissing his appointed counsel and in refusing to appoint substitute counsel
to represent Mr. Mingo, and such violated his right to due process of law. Further, the
district court should have provided him with warnings similar to those addressed in
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), before requiring him to proceed prose at his
post-conviction evidentiary hearing.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where a defendant claims that his right to due process was violated, the

reviewing court defers to the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712, 720 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

However, the reviewing court freely reviews the

application of constitutional principles to the facts found. Id.

C.

A Petitioner For Whom Counsel Has Been Appointed But Dismissed Should Be
Entitled To Substitute Counsel 1 Or, At A Minimum, Should Receive Faretta-Style
Warnings Before Being Required To Proceed Pro Se
Where Mr. Mingo had previously made the district court aware, on multiple

occasions, that he was experiencing difficulties with his appointed counsel, where
Mr. Mingo had serious mental health issues such that Mr. Mingo's trial counsel had
contemplated whether to request a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211,
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and where Mr. Mingo alternated between asking for conflict counsel, new counsel,
advisory counsel and representing himself pro

the district court was required to

inquire further before dismissing appointed counsel and requiring Mr. Mingo to
represent himself at his evidentiary hearing.
As part of its promise of due process, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
right to counsel in certain situations.

See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401

(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the
Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause.").
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "there is no Sixth Amendment
Right to counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction." Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho
389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014).
However, in Idaho, the legislature has provided for the appointment of postconviction counsel.

"A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction

proceeding is governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings
under the UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], a court-appointed attorney
'may be made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of
representation.

Idaho appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-

conviction counsel for non-frivolous claims as opposed to a constitutionally grounded
right. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004 ); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho
758, 761 (Ct. App. 2006); see also I.C. § 19-852(b); I.C. § 19-4904.
In Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is
entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the trial court determines that the post-
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conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 140 Idaho
135 Idaho

792 (quoting Brown v.

(2001 )). The Court relied on Brown, a case in which that

Court interpreted Idaho Code § 19-852(b)(3 ), a statute which set forth the standard for
determining whether or not a post-conviction proceedings is frivolous, "[i]t is frivolous if it
is 'not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to
bring at his own expense."'

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (quoting Brown.)

The

Charboneau Court further held that the proceeding is not frivolous and, thus, counsel
must be appointed, if the petitioner "alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim .
. . ." Charboneau, at 793 (emphasis added).
In Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), the Supreme Court had occasion to
revisit the standard for appointment of counsel in post-conviction cases. In that case,
the Court reaffirmed the Charboneau and Brown standard:
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the
petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the
record for possible nonfrivolous claims," Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,
679, 23 P .3d 138, 141 (2001 ), the court should appoint counsel if the facts
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim.
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. The Swader Court also made it clear that this standard is
much lower than the standard for deciding petitions for post-conviction relief on their
merits because, as had also been recognized in Charboneau, pro se petitioners
generally cannot investigate or properly present their claims (regardless of whether
those claims will ultimately be successful) without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 65455. Further, as the Idaho Supreme Court observed in Brown, 135 Idaho at 679, a pro
se petitioner may fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for post-conviction relief
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because he or she does not know the essential elements of the claim, and therefore the
mere omission of an element does not necessarily justify the denial

counsel.

In this case, the district court implicitly found that Mr. Mingo's petition was not
frivolous because it appointed counsel.

Further, the district court scheduled an

evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mingo's post-conviction petition, thereby implying that there
was an issue of material fact such that summary dismissal would be inappropriate.
Once the court appointed counsel, Mr. Mingo was entitled to continued
representation by appointed counsel. The United States Supreme Court has held that
once a state creates a right that implicates a person's liberty, the individual possessing
this right is entitled to "those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances
and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not
arbitrarily abrogated." Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,557 (1974). Therefore, once
the district court appointed counsel, that appointment was required to possess minimum
procedures to insure that the right was not arbitrary abrogated.

Among those

procedures should have been an inquiry to determine whether dismissal was
appropriate, whether the defendant wanted substitute counsel appointed and, if not,
whether he was capable of proceeding pro se.

Thus, it stands to reason that when

counsel is appointed by the district court and the petitioner thereafter asks for substitute
counsel but is denied, and then seeks to dismiss his current counsel and represent
himself, the district court has a duty to conduct some inquiry as to whether substitute
counsel should be appointed and whether the petitioner is capable of representing
himself.

8

In Faretta, the United

Supreme Court held that a defendant at trial has a

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to personally present a defense. Faretta,
U.S. at 819. The Faretta Court held that before a defendant is placed in the situation of
defending himself, he must "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation." 422 U.S. at 835. Faretta warnings must be given "so that the record
will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."'
Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex. rel. Mccann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). At a

minimum, the district court must be satisfied that the defendant understood the inherent
risks involved in waiving his right to counsel.

State v. Hunnel, 1

Idaho 623, 626

(1994 ).
Although there is no constitutional right to self-representation in a post-conviction
case such that Faretta-style warnings are constitutionally required, Faretta does
properly identify the concerns associated with self-representation both at the criminal
level and in collateral proceedings such as post-conviction.

Faretta-style warnings

should be given to a petitioner prior to dismissing his counsel and requiring him to
proceed pro se. At a minimum, the petitioner should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that he may choose to forgo representation by
counsel both knowingly and intelligently. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Thus, a district
court should conduct a Faretta-style inquiry into the voluntary and intelligent nature of a
petitioner's decision to represent himself.
Several jurisdictions have held that a petitioner's waiver of counsel must either
be voluntary or affirmatively made-while a formal Faretta hearing is not required, the
post-conviction court should engage in some inquiry into the voluntary and intelligent
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nature of

petitioner's decision to represent himself.

Jones v.

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the trial court must conduct some
inquiry into the voluntary and intelligent nature of a petitioner's decision to represent
himself and the petitioner "should be provided a sufficient opportunity to make a record
of his or her reasons for seeking discharge of counsel and/or self-representation."); c.f.,
People v. Duran, 757 P.2d at 1097 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that waiver of counsel
must be "voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent"); Owens v. State, 578
N.W.2d 542, 548 (N.D.1998) (recognizing that a post-conviction relief "applicant [has a]
right to proceed pro se in a post-conviction relief proceeding if the applicant knowingly
and intelligently elects to do so"); McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91-92 (Alaska
1974) (holding that a post-conviction relief applicant has a right to self-representation as
long as:

(1) the trial court determines that a prisoner is "capable of presenting his

allegations in a rational and coherent manner"; (2) the trial court determines that the
prisoner "understands precisely what he is giving up by declining the assistance of
counsel"; and (3) the trial court should provide the "option of having legal counsel
available for consultation"); Freeman v. State, 65 So.3d 553, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (holding that trial court's discretion in determining whether to allow a postconviction defendant to proceed pro se must be informed by the facts and
circumstances of the individual case, thus necessitating a hearing within the rubric of
Faretta

to

determine whether defendant understood

the

implications of self-

representation ).
Further, general policy considerations advocate in favor of requiring some sort of
inquiry when the petitioner complains that his appointed counsel has a conflict or
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communication problem with the petitioner or even in cases where appointed counsel is
simply not getting the job done. The UPCPA provides that, generally, only one petition
for post-conviction relief is allowed. I.C. § 19-4908. Section 19-4908 of the Idaho Code
shows a clear preference for post-conviction petitioners to bring only one postconviction action. It provides that, "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under
this [post-conviction] act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended
application," and that, "Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief may
[generally]

the basis for a subsequent application .... " I.C. § 19-4908.

In Idaho, a petitioner who is having difficulty reaching his appointed postconviction counsel or has ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel has no
recourse in Idaho's courts in light of the recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court, in
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), where the Court held that the

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a prior proceeding is not a "sufficient
reason" justifying the filing of a successive application for post-conviction relief. Id. 156
Idaho at

, 327 P.3d at 371.

Although the grant of counsel under I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary, it still carries
with it an implied promise of effectiveness.

Regardless of whether counsel was

appointed as a matter of right or in an exercise of the district court's discretion, the lay
petitioner should be able to rely upon the competence of his attorney. Otherwise, the
appointment of counsel would be but a hollow promise which would negate the statutory
authority of the district court to appoint counsel in cases where the facts alleged raise
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the possibility of a valid claim.
1995) (holding "that the failure to
to not providing counsel

v. Hickey, 914 P.2d 377, 379 (Colo. Ct. App.

effective assistance of counsel is tantamount

all" in those post-conviction cases where there is a limited

statutory right to counsel).
Here, during the pendency of his post-conviction petition, Mr. Mingo wrote a letter
and a memorandum to the district court asking it to allow him either to proceed pro se
because his counsel would not accept his calls or respond to his mail, or, in the
alternative, to appoint other counsel. (R., pp.45-49.) Mr. Mingo then filed an affidavit in
which he asked for different, competent counsel to be appointed to represent him
he was indigent and untrained in the law. (R., pp.51-52.) The district court
sent Mr. Mingo a letter explaining, inter alia, that it did not intend to appoint new counsel
to represent Mr. Mingo. (Letter, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 9/25/14.)
Based on this letter, Mr. Mingo then filed a letter in response, in which he indicated his
belief that in order to continue with his post-conviction case, he must proceed pro se,
but he again asked the court to "appoint someone who would help or at least advise
[him]." (R., pp.54-55.) Mr. Mingo also reminded the district court of his ignorance of the
law. (R., p.55.)
On December 16, 2013, at a status hearing to which Mr. Mingo was not
transported or participating telephonically, Mr. Mingo's appointed post-conviction
counsel advised the district court that he had looked into the issue of Mr. Mingo's
competency issues, and learned from Mr. Mingo's trial counsel that his office had
debated whether it would have been appropriate to ask the court to order a competency
evaluation, but ultimately made the decision not to request such an evaluation.
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(1

6/13 Tr., p.6,

3.) Post-conviction counsel also advised the district court that

he did not intend to have
(12/16/13 Tr., p.6, L.14

mental health

testify as to Mr. Mingo's capacity.

p.7, L.1.) Also at the status hearing, the district court noted

that "Mr. Mingo has repeatedly corresponded with this Court and the clerk with regard to
his dissatisfaction with representation." (12/16/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.8-10.)
On February 3, 2014, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. (2/3/14
Tr., p.14, L.1 - p.49, L.23; R., pp.73-79.) At the outset, Mr. Mingo asked the district
court to fire his attorney and to appoint a different attorney advisor to assist him at his
hearings and to provide legal advice. (2/3/14 Tr., p.17, L.18 - p.18, L.1.) After which
Mr. Mingo and the district court's conversation went as follows:
THE COURT: So you want to fire [counsel]?
MR. MINGO: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: You want to represent yourself today?
MR. MINGO: Yes, I do. September 22nd.
THE COURT: [Counsel], you are excused from the case.
relieved from representing Mr. Mingo.

You are

MR. MINGO: I'll take my file. September 22nd, to the Honorable Judge
from Kevin Mingo, Your Honor, at this time I request THE COURT: Mr. Mingo, stop. I don't need to listen to all of this. You're
representing yourself. We are here for an evidentiary hearing. Would you
like to make your opening statement?
(2/3/14 Tr., p.18, Ls.5-19.)

Mr. Mingo represented himself at his post-conviction

evidentiary hearing, but throughout the hearing expressed his reservations about acting

pro se and his discomfort with the process. For example, during Mr. Mingo's opening
statement, he said, "How my mental capability is being questioned whether I'm capable
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standing trial or not. I don't know, especially without my meds right now, I have no
" (2/3/14 Tr.,

Ls.1-4.) During the hearing, Mr. Mingo took the stand, and

during his testimony, asked the district court, "I don't know if I'm answering this right or if
I'm doing it right, Your Honor. I mean, seriously. Am I doing it right?" (2/3/14 Tr., p.27,
Ls.8-10.) To which the district court responded, "[t]his is your

sir. I can't advise

you what to do." (2/3/14 Tr., p.27, Ls.11-12.) Mr. Mingo then said, "[o]kay. There's a
reason why I was asking for an advisor on this." (2/3/14 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-14.) Mr. Mingo
called his trial counsel to testify, and during the questioning, asked his former counsel, 4
"[s]o did you ever question - you questioned my mental capability a couple of times."
(2/3/14 Tr., p.42, Ls.11-12.) To which his former counsel responded, "I was worried
about it a couple times, yes." (2/3/14 Tr., p.42, L.13.) Mr. Mingo then said, "[w]ish I had
my meds right now." (2/3/14 Tr., p.42, L.14.) In closing, Mr. Mingo asked the district
court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, argued some of the salient facts
surrounding the traffic stop upon which his criminal conviction was based, and said, "I
mean, I know that.
understand?"

That - I might be screwing myself by doing this pro se, you

(2/3/14 Tr., p.47, Ls.11-13.) At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Mingo

asked the district court to appoint him an adviser:
MR. MINGO: Okay. If I am, Your Honor, can I be allowed an adviser?
THE COURT: An adviser?
MR. MINGO: An adviser.
THE COURT: Well, you told me you didn't want an attorney so I released --

The State subpoenaed Mr. Mingo's trial counsel to testify at the evidentiary hearing.
(R., p.87.)

4
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MR. MINGO:

that I can just

legal

to.

THE COURT: No.
(2/3/14 Tr., p.48, Ls.11-19.) Where the record is replete with indications that Mr. Mingo
made numerous requests for different legal counsel because his appointed postconviction attorney refused to communicate with Mr. Mingo, was not meeting his courtordered deadlines, and not honoring his requests to see his discovery, Mr. Mingo may
have received ineffective assistance from his post-conviction counsel.

Further

necessitating an inquiry into Mr. Mingo's capability to represent himself on postconviction was the fact that Mr. Mingo's mental capacity and/or his mental health was at
issue in the criminal case and whether he was competent to stand trial or assist in his
own defense was never determined.

At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mingo even

questioned his own capacity to understand the proceedings. (2/3/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-4.)
Had Mr. Mingo been represented by able counsel during his post-conviction evidentiary
hearing, the issues with his mental capacity during the entry of his guilty plea could
have been further explored, and perhaps even bolstered by expert testimony, as
contemplated by Mr. Mingo's counsel during the December 16, 2012 status hearing.
(12/16/13 Tr., p.6, L.6 - p.7, L.1, p.10, L.25 - p.12, L.5.)

In light of all of these

circumstances, as well as due process right created by the appointment of counsel, the
district court had a duty to inquire further of Mr. Mingo regarding his problems with his
appointed counsel, before dismissing appointed counsel and requiring Mr. Mingo to
proceed pro se at the evidentiary hearing.
Because Idaho law provides that a district court may appoint counsel, should the
petitioner have alleged facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, and because there
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is no right in Idaho to bring a successive post-conviction petition

on

omissions of appointed post-conviction counsel, the importance

adequate post-

conviction counsel is critical.

errors or

In a situation such as this one, where Mr. Mingo

repeatedly communicated to the district court that his counsel was not responding to his
attempts to communicate with him, Mr. Mingo asked several times for other counsel to
be appointed, and Mr. Mingo repeatedly expressed his reservations about selfrepresentation, the district court abused its discretion by not inquiring further of
Mr. Mingo before dismissing his appointed counsel on the day of the evidentiary
hearing, and requiring him, with no further notice or additional time to prepare to present
his case, to go it alone at the evidentiary hearing.
Mr. Mingo contends that, if he had not been required to represent himself at the
evidentiary hearing without any advance notice, he would have prevailed at the
evidentiary hearing and would have received the appropriate relief-a finding that
Mr. Mingo was not competent to enter a guilty plea; he would thus be permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea.
The statutory provision providing for the appointment of post-conviction counsel
would be a hollow provision indeed, should this Court allow Mr. Mingo's complaints
about his appointed post-conviction counsel and his attempts to obtain different counsel
go unheeded, particularly where he will not be permitted to file a successive petition in
which he could assert that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Mingo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and remand the case with instructions
to hold a hearing to determine whether Mr. Mingo should be appointed substitute
counsel for a new evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 26 th day of September, 2014.

SALLY1 . 6O(EY
'
Deputy State Appellate"'Public Defender
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